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The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and
Procedure
HENRY J. FRIENDLY*
Judge Friendly admits that the courts must address them-
selves in some instances to issues of social policy. He would pre-
fer, however, that a court rest its decision on an ascertainable
jural principle rather than support its decision on the basis of its
conception of what is desirable social policy. When courts do rely
on social or economic data, they should observe procedural fair-
ness as a goal in its own right and as a tool towards obtaining
correct and complete information. When the economic and social
data is indeterminate, a court should refuse to base its decision
on such information. If a decision is made and the courts frame
an elaborate decree, they should remember that they are engaged
in rulemaking and operate as other rulemakers, keeping close
watch over the effects of their ruling.
The mouth-filling topic announced for discussion can be use-
fully broken into two parts: Should courts decide issues of social
policy? If they do so, are some modifications of the adversary system
desirable?
Even as thus simplified, the issue is so profound and the rele-
vant literature so vast that making proper answers would require
years of study and thought rather than hours eked out over a few
months from the press of other work. What I shall put before you
thus is not a lecture but some notes for one which will never be
written. Mr. Justice Rehnquist has approached the subject from a
novel and thoughful angle; I shall approach it from a more conven-
tional one. In order to relieve you of inordinate suspense, I will state
some tentative answers now.
The courts must address themselves in some instances to issues
of social policy, not because this is particularly desirable, but be-
cause often there is no feasible alternative. One is reminded of Sir
Winston Churchill's remark that democracy is the worst form of
government, except that no one has been able to think of a better
one.' On the other hand, if an ascertainable jural principle will
decide a case in a way the court finds acceptable,2 it will do better
* Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit; Presiding Judge, Spe-
cial Court under the Regional Rail Reorganization Act.
1. J. F. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE 264 (mem. ed. 1964).
2. While I am acutely conscious of the question-begging character of this phrase, an
effort to define it would require a lecture in itself. Generally, what I mean is a principle drawn
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not to support its decision on the basis of its conception of what is
desirable social policy and particularly not on disputable social or
economic data. When courts need to rely on such data, they should
be careful to observe procedural fairness, both as a goal in its own
right and as a tool towards getting information that is correct and
complete. When the economic or social information is indetermi-
nate, a court should refuse to use such data as a basis for its deci-
sion, although such a refusal should not foreclose a later attempt to
convince the court when better information may be available. While
I do not have time to defend all these propositions, the following
discussion will afford some indication of the bases for them.
At first blush the question of whether courts should decide
issues of social policy would seem to cry for a negative answer.
Judges, whether appointed or elected, were not put on the bench for
that purpose.' As Justice Frankfurter said: "Courts are not repre-
sentative bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex of a
democratic society. 4 In deciding questions of social policy they thus
lack the important qualities of legitimacy and also, at least in the
case of judges appointed for life, of accountability to the electorate.
All of us must respond in some degree to Judge Learned Hand's
remark: "For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy
of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I
assuredly do not."5 Moreover, courts can act on questions of social
policy only at the call of litigants; then, they generally must act
although postponement might be the wiser course. While courts are,
primarily from the text of a constitution or a statute as illuminated by history and preceden-
tial development, or from the trend of common law decisions, rather than one derived directly
from a consideration of social or economic views or data. The reader will find elucidation in
A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 86-87 (1970); B. CARDOZO, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (third lecture) (1921); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles
of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
3. It could be argued that the Supreme Court has become an exception to this statement.
Awareness that many of the Court's decisions on the effect of broadly worded constitutional
provisions could reasonably go either way leads the President and the Senate to scrutinize
the social attitudes of a nominee with some care. But, apart from the impossibility of an
accurate prediction, the life tenure of the Justices prevents them from being a representative
cross-section of the electorate of the time. The Court of the early 1930's is a sufficient exam-
ple; not many Americans, even of a conservative bent, would have wished Justice McRey-
nolds to be speaking for them in the latter part of his 27-year term.
4. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951). He added that "the independence
of the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the passions of the day and
assume primary responsibility in choosing between competing.political, economic and social
pressures." Id.
5. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958). Judge Hand went on to say: "Of course I know
how illusory would be the belief that my vote determined anything; but nevertheless when I
go to the polls I have a satisfaction in the sense that we are all engaged in a common venture."
Id. at 73-74. See also Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. Rzv. 1057, 1061 (1975).
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or should be, aware of the effects of their decisions beyond the case
sub judice, their response is often triggered by outrageous facts that
may not be at all representative.' Professor Morris R. Cohen consid-
ered the judicial system to be "intellectually the weakest part of our
government," having "the least opportunity to get information on
the issues which it has to decide."7 Save in a few specialized courts,
judges are generalists, and, although much of their virtue has been
thought to lie in that very fact, it seriously handicaps them in sifting
masses of technical social and economic data.
Unlike legislatures, which may properly frame pragmatic rules
having no relation to strict logic,' courts should render a principled
decision that will apply to a great sweep of cases. Moreover, unlike
legislatures, courts are generally confined to prohibiting or enforcing
conduct, whether by the award of damages or, in the type of cases
we are discussing, more frequently by injunction or declaratory
judgment.' Legislatures, however, have many further options avail-
able to them, including taxation and subsidies. Also, the legislature
can offer "sweeteners" in the form of increased benefits of a differ-
ent sort that will justify the abolition of a rule which, however well
conceived in its origin, has become unworkable.'0
The adversary system, even at its best, is poorly calculated to
arrive at the truth; the lawyer's duty is to win his case by any fair
6. The paradigm is In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). A juvenile court had committed, for
a term of six years, a 15 year old boy charged with making remarks "of the irritatingly
offensive, adolescent, sex variety" on the telephone to a married woman. The maximum
penalty for such an offense committed by an adult was a fine of $5 to $50 or imprisonment
for not more than two months. It is questionable whether if the facts had been less shocking,
the Court would have ranged so far. Other examples are Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1973)
and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), discussed in M. HoRwrrz, THE COURTS
AND SOCIAL POLICY 41-42 (1977), an illuminating book from which I have drawn heavily.
7. M. COHEN, AMERICAN THOUGHT: A CRICAL SKETCH 164 (1954). See also M. COHEN,
Should Legal Thought Abandon Clear Distinctions?, in REASON AND LAW 159 (1950).
8. See W. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING Socimrv 155 (1959) in reference to the Law
Reform [Personal Injuries] Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 41, § 2[11, concerning deduction
of one half of industrial injury benefits from recovery for loss of earnings in personal injury
damage actions. See also Justice Douglas' statement: "The legislature may select one phase
of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others.... The prohibition of the Equal
Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination." Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (citation omitted); Dworkin, supra note 5, at 1091-92.
9. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HAiv. L. REv. 1281,
1292-96 (1976).
10. See, e.g., Longshoremen & Harbor Workers Compensation Act Amendments of
1972, Pub. L. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251, where an increase in a scale of workmen's compensation
benefits that had become outmoded made it not only politically possible but morally defensi-
ble to abolish the triangular action for unseaworthiness of longshoreman versus ship versus
stevedoring employer that was plaguing the federal courts. See Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v.
Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co.
v. Caputo, 429 U.S. 998 (1977); S. REP. No. 92-1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1976).
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means. Moreover, the "best" advocacy is rarely seen. Fate may will
it that even in the greatest cases one or both sides will be repre-
sented by counsel with far less than the highest degree of compe-
tence. Moreover, there often are marked inequalities in the re-
sources of the two sides and the skill of their counsel." All of this
has been the subject of recent stimulating discourse by Judge Mar-
vin Frankel.'" One could readily cite additional factors, but the task
has been performed by others 3 and what I have said will suffice. 4
Despite the objections to the courts deciding issues of social
policy that I have recounted, it is apparent that they have been
doing so for a long time. Professor James Willard Hurst'5 and, more
recently, Professor Morton Horwitz"5 have written, penetratingly
11. In cases involving states, the inequality of skill does not always weigh on the side of
the state; public interest lawyers and private attorneys working "pro bono" often outclass
hard pressed and underpaid offices of city counsel or even of state attorneys general. Perhaps
this is a neglected field for pro bono activity.
12. Frankel, Trials and Procedure-From Private Fights Toward Public Justice, in
AMERICAN LAW: THE TuIRD CENTURY 155 (B. Schwartz ed. 1976); Frankel, The Adversary
Judge, 54 TEX. L. REv. 465 (1976); Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123
U. PA. L. REv. 1031 (1975).
13. Notably by M. HoRwrrz, supra note 6, at 31-62, and the books and articles cited
therein at 33 n.23. Before his elevation to the Supreme Court, Robert H. Jackson, protesting
against the Court's anti-New Deal decisions, wrote of "limitations inherent in legal proce-
dures which make the lawsuit an unfit channel for exercise of political power, and which
suggest that those who possess no other implements should scrupulously avoid judgments for
which it is not adequate." R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 302 (1941).
14. I have tried to remain aloof from the debate generated by Professor Ronald Dworkin's
article, supra note 5. The controversy, summarily stated, is this: Professor H.L.A. Hart has
written that where existing law is indeterminate, judges of higher courts exercise a
"legislative" discretion in which policy considerations may be taken into account. H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-32 (1961). See also Hart, American Jurisprudence Through
English Eyes, 11 GA. L. REv. 969 (1977). This is a view for which he has distinguished prede-
cessors; for example, recall the statement of Justice Holmes: "Where there is doubt the
simple tool of logic does not suffice, and even if it is disguised and unconscious, the judges
are called on to exercise the sovereign prerogative of choice." O.W. HOLMES, Law In Science
and Science In Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 239 (1920), and B. CARDOZO, supra note 2,
at 102-05, 112-19.
Professor Dworkin disagrees. In such cases, he argues, the judge may rely on a newly
discovered but nevertheless preexisting "principle" which shows that "the decision respects
or secures some individual or group right," but not on considerations of "policy" which show
only that "the decision advances or protects some collective goal of the community as a
whole." Dworkin, supra note 5, at 1059. I wish to remain aloof both because the debate is
being carried on with such vigor and at such length, notably in 11 GA. L. Rxv. (1977), where
some 450 pages are largely devoted to it, see also the book reviews of DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY (1977), reviewed by Gabel, 91 HAsv. L. Rv. 302 (1977) and Lyons, 87 YALE L.J.
415 (1977), and because of my own deficiencies. In jurisprudential controversies of this sort I
tend to agree with whomever I have read last. Beyond this, it is not clear to me how far apart,
in any practically significant sense, the disputants really are.
15. See J. HURsT, LAw AND THE CONDrIONS OF FREEDOM (1956); J. HURST, THE GROWTH
OF AMERICAN LAW (1950).
16. M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977). For a discus-
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and exhaustively, on how American courts molded English common
law in light of their perceptions of the special needs of our society.
These decisions were no less based on social policy because that
purpose was not always expressly avowed. Let me add two exam-
ples.
In the great debate about courts deciding policy issues, it is
strange that so little attention has been paid to a long established
instance where judges have been not simply permitted but required
to enforce what they believe to be sound policy. None of us, I sup-
pose, was particularly shocked to learn in the first year of law school
that courts must refuse to enforce contracts that are "contrary to
public policy." Perhaps we were told that an otherwise little known
English judge had produced the aphorism: "[Public policy] is a
very unruly horse and when once you get astride it you never know
where it will carry you,"' 7 and that a better known judge had later
said: "[J]udges are more to be trusted as interpreters of the law
than as expounders of what is called public policy,"'" and that a
Lord Chancellor had even attempted to freeze the categories of con-
tracts contrary to public policy to what they were at the beginning
of the twentieth century.'9 We were also taught, however, that in
this country courts did not so limit themselves and have felt few
inhibitions about expanding the categories of such contracts. 0 Here
we encounter a "rule" requiring judges to consider policy, although
our law school teachers did not tell us and scholars have not ade-
quately discussed how judges should ascertain policy for this pur-
pose when the legislature has not furnished them with guidance.
We have also witnessed, without much furor having been
aroused, what I think to have been the creation of new common law
rights due to a judicial perception of policy. The most striking ex-
ample is the law concerning strict products liability. Fifty years ago,
sion of changes in the common law of water rights, see id. at 34-47; the broadening of a
tenant's right to remove "fixtures," see id. at 54-56; the retraction of the common law of
nuisance, see id. at 74-78; the general replacement of strict tort liability by the concept of
negligence, see id. at 97-99; and the expansion of the concept of contract so as to permit
contracting parties generally to substitute a new regime for themselves, see id. at 160-210.
17. Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 252 (1824).
18. In re Mirams, [18911 1 Q.B. 594, 595.
19. Janson v. Driefontein Consol. Mines, Ltd., [19021 A.C. 484, 491.
20. See 6 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS (1962); L. SIMPSON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 430-34, 441-
45 (2d ed. 1965); 14 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1628, 1629, 1629A (3d ed. Jaeger 1972);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, ch. 14, Introduction, Note and Reporter's Note, §
320(2), Comments b and c (Tent. Draft No. 12, March 1, 1977). An outstanding example is
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), which struck down,
as contrary to public policy, an automobile manufacturer's disclaimer of an implied warranty
of merchantability that had been widely used.
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Judge Cardozo's then recent decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co., 2 that the duty of care of the manufacturer of an automobile
extended beyond the immediate purchaser, was still a novel al-
though quickly accepted doctrine.22 However, it was well within the
negligence model that had become received learning. Subsequently,
a decision in Michigan 3 and a more widely known one in New Jer-
sey24 led to what Dean Prosser called "the most rapid and altogether
spectacular overturn of an established rule in the entire history of
the law of torts. '25 At first an attempt was made to cloak the revolu-
tion within the rubric of implied warranty, but this was a strange
sort of warranty since no degree of contrary language could disclaim
it."6 The revolution culminated in section 402A of the American Law
Institute's Second Restatement of Torts,"2 which is now regularly
cited by courts as if it were a statute. Although "warranty" may
initially have furnished a crutch that was soon discarded, the mo-
tive power behind the victory of strict products liability was a notion
of social policy, just as the replacement of strict liability by negli-
gence had been a century before. 28 Dean Prosser presented the argu-
ments which have proved to be convincing to the courts:
The public interest in human life and safety demands the
maximum possible protection that the law can give against dan-
gerous defects in products which consumers must buy, and
against which they are helpless to protect themselves; and it
justifies the imposition, upon all suppliers of such products, of
full responsibility for the harm they cause, even though the sup-
plier has done his best.
2
21. 217 N.Y. 382, 11 N.E. 1050 (1916).
22. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 96, at 642-43 (4th ed. 1971). As the text points out, the
initial limitation to "a thing of danger" was rapidly eroded.
23. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d
873 (1958).
24. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
25. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 97, at 654. Dean Prosser himself played no small part
in the revolution. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. Rlv. 791 (1966); Prosser,
The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
26. The death knell of the "warranty" explanation was sounded by Justice Traynor in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
27. As Dean Prosser, who was the reporter, noted, "itlhe change in the law was so rapid
that the Section was actually drawn three times." W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 98, at 657
n.51.
28. See M. HoRwrrz, supra note 16, at 97-99.
29. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 97, at 651. Dean Prosser believed that another much
urged consideration carried less weight, namely, "the the burden of accidental injuries
caused by defective chattels should be placed upon the seller because he is best able to
distribute the more or less inevitable losses to the general public by means of liability insur-
ance, treated as a part of his costs, and included in his prices." Id. at 650. I am not so sure.
[Vol. 33:21
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What is this other than the courts deciding a question of social
policy through the adversary process? 3 Yet, although there were
some outcries from outraged manufacturers, few people today are
concerned about this venture in applying judicial views of social
policy.
I have dwelt on these two instances of the courts applying their
notions of social policy not only because they are interesting in
themselves but also because of the calm with which they have been
received, in contrast to the storm over judicial policymaking in
other instances now to be considered, sheds some light on the prob-
lem under discussion. Refusal to enforce contracts that are contrary
to public policy and the creation of products liability are entirely
in the private sector.31 The storm has arisen in the public sector and
is particularly intense when courts resort to ,notions of social policy
to set aside actions of other branches of government strongly sup-
ported by many citizens-notably invalidation of legislative or exec-
utive action on constitutional grounds and of administrative action
pursuant to judicial review. The criticism is natural. If policymak-
ing authority has been vested in another body, by what warrant does
a court substitute its own contrary views? As was said by Professor
Bickel: "All too many federal judges have been induced to view
themselves as holding roving commissions as problem solvers, and
as charged with a duty to act when majoritarian institutions do
not. "32
In the constitutional area, however, there are important dis-
tinctions. Some provisions of the Bill of Rights invite the courts to
develop and then to apply notions of social policy. Perhaps the
plainest example is the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the
eighth amendment. Nearly everyone agrees with Chief Justice War-
30. Recognizing the problem created for him in Henningsen and its progeny, Professor
Dworkin seeks to explain the new doctrine as the result of preexisting "principles." DWORKIN,
supra note 14, at 24, 27. But this merely moves the inquiry back to the question of where
some of these principles come from and why they should be applied not only to manufacturers
of automobiles but to all products manufacturers, although not to other persons. Dworkin
answers that the "origin of these as legal principles lies not in a particular decision of some
legislature or court, but in a sense of appropriateness developed in the profession and the
public over time." Id. at 40. But that sense of "appropriateness," in my view, is nothing more
or less than an opinion about policy, and whether mediately through the modulation of
"principles" or immediately through direct influence, it was "policy" and not "principle"
that caused the courts to shift the automobile manufacturer into the strict liability regime
while leaving the automobile operator under the rule of negligence.
31. Sometimes the taking of a new direction in the private sector affects the wealth of
only the first round of litigants. This was notably true of strict products liability. Once the
doctrine was established, manufacturers simply marked up their prices to reflect the cost of
insurance or self-insurance.
32. A. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 134.
0
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ren's statement that the concept of cruelty is not static but must
continually be reexamined in light of "the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," 3 although
agreement as to exactly what those "evolving standards" are does
not always exist." Likewise, the first amendment necessarily takes
the courts into areas of policy. With all respect to Justice Black,
"shall make no law" does not mean, and could never have been
thought to mean, "shall make no law." Congress must make laws
that impinge on absolute freedom of speech and of the press in order
to protect the nation against foreign danger and internal subversion.
Congress and the state legislatures may also make such laws to
prevent disorders, to protect individual reputations and to deal with
false advertising and pornography. The question is not whether but
to what extent freedom of speech will be curtailed, with the first
amendment creating the need for an extremely strong justification.
Here again, only a few criticize courts for making the policy deci-
sion, although many disagree with the results. When the framers
adopted the fourth amendment with its first clause prohibiting
''unreasonable searches and seizures," they inevitably required the
courts to decide what was "unreasonable." Although the Supreme
Court has narrowed the inquiry by partially reading the second
clause of the amendment relating to warrants into the first clause,
value judgments are still required. No one questions the process
whereby the Court determines what is or is not unreasonable, even
when there are sharp differences of opinion concerning the result.
Rather, the debate has been over the Court engrafting on the
amendment something that is not specifically there, the exclusion-
ary rule. 5
33. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). See also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, 666 (1962). This had been anticipated by Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373
(1910).
34. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 385-86 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at
436-39 (Powell, J., dissenting) (discussing contemporary attitudes towards capital punish-
ment).
35. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482-89 (1976); id. at 496-502 (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring); id. at 509-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 443-46
(1976); id. at 460 (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-55
(1974); id. at 355 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Here, there is concern whether the Court may
have been too easily convinced that "[i]f criminals go free when constables blunder, con-
stables will blunder less." M. HoRwrrz, supra note 6, at 220. It is not clear that this was in
fact the rationale or in any event the sole rationale of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914) and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The opinions can be read as resting also on
the concept that exclusion is a part of the "rights" guaranteed by the fourth amendment or
on the basis that courts should not be a party to a violation of the Constitution. However,
Justice Clark, the author of the Mapp opinion, later came close to resting the exclusionary
rule solely on its supposed deterrent effect in justifying the holding in Linkletter v. Walker,
[Vol. 33:21
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I move now from these relatively tranquil waters to the two
cases Where the Court's reliance on arguments of social policy has
stirred the highest waves of criticism. I apologize for a renewed
discussion of decisions that have been written and talked about
extensively, but they are familiar and important and, therefore,
perhaps can teach us the most.
The first is Brown v. Board of Education, and more particularly
the psychological footnote .3 There seems to be general agreement
that while Brown was a good-indeed, as it now seems, an inevita-
ble-decision, the decision was not, for whatever reasons,21 embod-
ied in a good opinion. Judge Learned Hand was quick to point out
that although Brown was generally thought to have overruled the
"separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,3 and in fact,
ultimately led to that result, the opinion did not do so at all. Rather,
Plessy "was distinguished because of the increased importance of
education in the fifty-six years that had elapsed since it was de-
cided. '39 The reasoning was that: (1) education had become so im-
portant as to be "a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms"; (2) the Kansas district court had "found" that
"'[slegregation with the sanction of law . . . has a tendency to
[retard] the educational and mental development of negro children
and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a
racial[ly] integrated school system . . . .' "; and (3) the Court
believed that "this finding is amply supported by modern author-
ity."4 All of this led to the crucial statement that "[sleparate
educational facilities are inherently unequal," and to the conclusion
that the equal protection clause had thus been violated. Social pol-
icy entered the decision at two points-the Court's emphasis on the
special importance of education and its determination that separate
education was "inherently unequal."
381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965), that Mapp did not apply to convictions that had become final
before it was decided. The Court now characterizes deterrence as the "prime purpose" of or
"the primary justification" for the exclusionary rule. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
347 (1974); see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482-89 (1976).
36. 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 & n.11 (1954).
37. It has often been suggested that the Brown opinion had to be written as it was in
order to obtain the desired unanimity and avoid concurring opinions. While the account in
R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 678-99 (1976), demonstrates that the Chief Justice had his prob-
lems in achieving this goal, it does not cast much light on why the opinion was written as it
was (except for the inclusion of the final paragraph relating to the remedy, 347 U.S. at 495-
96) or on the curious contrast between the opinion in Brown and that in the District of
Columbia case, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
38. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
39. L. HAND, supra note 5, at 54.
40. 347 U.S. at 492-95.
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If one looked only at the Brown opinion, it would be clear be-
yond peradventure that the decision was limited to public educa-
tion. The opinion expressly stated the question to be "whether
Plessy v. Ferguson should be held inapplicable to public educa-
tion." 4' The entire discussion related to this specific area and the
holding was that, because of the unique importance of public educa-
tion, "the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place" in that field.
The clear implication was that Plessy remained alive, although per-
haps not entirely well, in other fields of lesser social importance and
that an overruling of it in such fields would be done only by a fully
explicated opinion, an opinion that would have been rather hard to
write in light of the emphasis Brown placed on the unique import-
ance of public education.42
We know now, as the Court seemingly must have known then,
that such conclusions would have been wholly wrong. One needed
to read only a few pages beyond the Brown opinion itself to find the
Court, in Boling v. Sharpe,43 invalidating school segregation in the
District of Columbia, not on the basis of the unique importance of
education or the adverse psychological effect of segregated schools
on black children, but because "[c]lassifications based solely upon
race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are con-
trary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect."" At the
beginning of the very next term, the Court proceeded to render "a
series of subsequent per curiam decisions invalidating state-
imposed racial segregation in virtually all areas of life." 5 Hence,
"[iut is not surprising.., that constitutional scholars.., have been
reluctant to believe that the Court relied to any great extent on the
'modern authorities' cited in its opinion"" or on the "facts" found
by the Kansas district court,-and that these scholars have been
busily engaged in rewriting the Brown opinion. 7
Would not the Court have done better to decide Brown on the
basis of a jural principle as it did in Bolling, rather than on the basis
of supposed psychological facts? Several such bases could have been
derived from the text and the history of the equal protection clause.
The Court might have gone to the full extent of saying that any
41. Id. at 492.
42. This is my reading of Professor Wechsler's criticism of the Brown opinion in his
Holmes lecture, supra note 2, at 32-33, although some have construed it as going further.
43. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
44. Id. at 499.
45. Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis,
60 CALiF. L. REv. 275, 278 & n.17 (1972).
46. Id. at 279-80 & n.24.
47. For a summary of these efforts, see id. at 279-83 & nn.24, 30 & 31.
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governmental classification based on race was a denial of equal
protection." It might have said, less broadly, that any racial classifi-
cation imposed by a majority upon a minority constituted such a
denial. It might have said, still less broadly and with a view to the
particular evil that gave rise to the writing of the fourteenth amend-
ment, that any racial classification imposed upon blacks violated
the equal protection clause." It might have said, as Professor Good-
man has suggested, 0 that since a racial classification is constitu-
tionally suspect, the state had the burden of showing that such
classification did no harm, and the finding of the Kansas district
court and the opinions of the psychologists were relevant, although
not really necessary, to show how far the state had fallen short of
discharging that burden. Finally, in light of the doctrine that has
since developed, the Court could have said that any racial classifica-
tion must be shown to be required by a compelling interest and that
the state had not done so.
If the Court had taken any of these courses, it would not have
been subject to the criticism that it was using psychological evi-
dence of dubious validity,5 at least on an across-the-board basis,52
as the justification for substituting its factual judgment that
"[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal" for the
legislature's factual judgments that they were not. Admittedly, the
jural bases suggested above are not interchangeable; each would
have had consequences different from the Brown opinion and from
each other for such issues as the appropriate remedy for de jure
segregation, what was to be done about de facto segregation and the
constitutionality of reverse discrimination.5 3 But the Court and the
country would have been better off if the Court had placed the
Brown decision on jural considerations which were clearly within its
province as the interpreter of the Constitution and which would
have yielded readier and more acceptable answers in future contro-
48. See generally Wechsler, supra note 2, at 32.
49. This ground might have been too narrow to include the District of Columbia case
which had to rest on the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
50. Goodman, supra note 45, at 282-83.
51. Id. at 279; Epps, The Impact of School Desegregation on Aspirations, Self-Concepts
and Other Aspects of Personality, 39 LAw & ComMP. PRoB. 300, 303-13 (1975).
52. Professor Wechsler questioned early whether "the finding in Topeka [was] applica-
ble without more to Clarendon County, South Carolina, with 2,799 colored students and only
295 white." Wechsler, supra note 2, at 33. Certainly it is not self-evident that black children
are benefited psychologically by being bussed to a distant predominantly white school where
they may meet a blank or even a hostile reception.
53. All this is carefully developed in Professor Goodman's article, see supra note 45.
The foregoing, of course, was written several months before the decision in Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 57 L. Ed. 750 (1978), which I have not attempted to reflect.
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versies rather than on unestablished facts concerning segregation's
psychological effects in public education.
If Brown could have been decided without the Court's plunging
into the realm of social policy, it is not clear that this can be said
of the abortion cases, Roe v. Wade54 and Doe v. Bolton.5 These
decisions have alarmed not only those who dislike their result, but
others who as citizens, applaud their basic accomplishment, yet as
scholars cannot conscientiously defend the Court's having pro-
ceeded as it did.56 The Court recognized a woman's desire to have
an abortion not only as a "liberty" protected by the due process
clause, a proposition with which almost everyone would agree, but
also as a right so "fundamental" that the state may do nothing in
the first trimester of pregnancy except require consultation with and
performance of the abortion by a licensed physician, and even in the
later periods of pregnancy is subject to strict limitations in control-
ling abortions.57
The considerations of social policy militating against both the
strict Texas statute considered in Roe and the more modern Georgia
statute considered in Doe were strong indeed. Justice Blackmun
described these only partially when he wrote, in a passage that tends
to be obscured by the mass of historical data, that:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant
woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific
and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy
may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force
upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm
may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by
child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated
with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a
child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise,
to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficul-
ties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be in-
volved.5"
This, as I learned in preparing to hear an attack on the New York
abortion statute which happily was repealed, was only part of the
sad story. Prohibition of abortions had no more prevented them
than prohibition of alcohol had prevented drinking. Whereas the
54. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
55. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
56. See, e.g., A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 113-
14 (1976); LUSKY, By WHAT RIGHT 15-17, 100 (1976); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Com-
ment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALZ L.J. 920 (1973).
57. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-55, 164-65 (1973).
58. Id. at 153.
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latter produced bootleggers and speakeasies operating in defiance of
the law, the former created illegal abortion mills. While well-to-do
women could afford a high-class, high-priced abortionist who rarely
was subjected to prosecution, a hospital surgical procedure ostensi-
bly for some other cause, or a trip to a foreign country where abor-
tions were permitted, these options were not open to the poor. The
woman of scant means was relegated to the choice between undergo-
ing, or undertaking, procedures threatening her health or even her
life," or carrying an unwanted child to term and rearing it there-
after, often alone. The problem had been aggravated-by increased
sexual permissiveness especially among teenagers; even the more
liberal statutes afforded no help in most cases of voluntary inter-
course, unless the girl was so young as to have been a victim of
"statutory rape." As Justice Marshall was later to say in his elo-
quent dissent in Beal v. Doe, the abortion statutes "brutally coerce
poor women to bear children whom society will scorn for every day
of their lives."10 Justice Blackmun must have been fully aware of all
this, as witness the final paragraph of his subsequent dissent in
Beal" where he condemns the majority for refusing to recognize the
realities of poverty. A detailed presentation of these considerations
of social policy would, to my mind, have furnished a much more
persuasive basis for judicial innovation than the opinion's lengthy
discussion of the Hippocratic Oath 2 and the abortion practices of
the ancient world or debate concerning the precise moment when a
fetus becomes a person."
Ultimately, however, one must face the question of how a case
of such overwhelming social import could be translated into a prin-
ciple of constitutional law, particularly in the face of what we now
know to be deeply felt contrary views. 4 While the opinion rather
59. Emphasis on the serious injuries and deaths due to illegal abortions, which is only
glancingly mentioned in Roe, id. at 150, would have been a useful complement to the compar-
ison of the relative risks of legal abortion and normal childbirth on which the Court relied to
answer the "protection of the life and health of the mother" argument. See id. at 149.
60. 432 U.S. 438, 456 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 463 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The point was also made in several amicus
briefs in Roe.
62. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130-32 (1973).
63. Id. at 159-62.
64. Some have doubted whether it is possible to find any acceptable articulable principle
for the decision. See Cox, supra note 56, at 113-14. Still, the search for a principled rationale
in Roe continues. A student commentator thought he found a possible approach in passages
suggesting that the state lacks power to adopt "one theory" of life in light of the "wide
divergence of thinking" on the subject. Note, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HAnv. L.
Rv. 70, 145 n.41 (1977) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160-62). But one must ask why
does a state lack power to decide this question when it can decide so many others where
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convincingly demonstrated that during the first trimester the state's
interest in the mother's health was an insufficient reason for prohib-
iting abortions, it provided no real answer to the argument that the
state's interest in preserving the fetus was alone a sufficient justifi-
cation for drastic limitation of abortions. The invocation of a "right
of privacy" was not convincing. Not only is there nothing very pri-
vate about an abortion, but the cases cited did not sustain the
proposition for which they were relied upon. 5 Justice Brandeis'
much-quoted reference to the "right to be let alone" in his Olmstead
dissent" was in the context of a protest against wiretapping. As his
law clerk of that term, I can provide direct evidence that the Justice
was not thinking about abortions and had no idea that he was fram-
ing a general principle that would include them. The Court's earlier
decisions protecting sexual liberty, although superficially more to
the point, likewise afforded no real support. Surely there is a recog-
nizable distinction between invading the body to compel steriliza-
tion and forbidding such an invasion for the purpose of abortion;
moreover, even the decision striking down the sterilization provision
in Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act had been placed
on grounds of equal protection rather than on the basis of due pro-
cess. 7 The equal protection clause furnished ample basis for the
decision invalidating Virginia's statute prohibiting marriages be-
tween blacks and whites,"8 although the Court also relied on due
process as well. Moreover, that case presented no questions of state
interest relating to the health of the mother and the life of the fetus.
The Connecticut contraception statute had conveniently provided
a real basis for invoking the right of privacy since it prohibited the
use rather than the sale of contraceptives," and thereby enabled the
opinion writer to paint a lurid picture of policemen secreted in mari-
tal bedrooms. In addition, the Court's only statement with respect
to the distribution of contraceptives had rested on grounds of equal
protection, not due process. 0 Thus, there was no real precedential
support for the abortion decisions, and it was a bit disingenuous to
rest them on a recognized "right of privacy." Still, that does not
thinking is equally divergent. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
651 (9th ed. 1975).
65. See the cases cited in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973), which deal for the most
part with issues of search and seizure and self-incrimination under the fourth and fifth
amendments and issues discussed in the text accompanying notes 66-70 infra.
66. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
67. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
68. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
69. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
70. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972).
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necessarily mean that they were wrong; indeed, I would like to be-
lieve that in their core-forbidding prohibition of abortions in the
early months of pregnancy-they were right.
My problems with the decisions, in addition to the Court's
failure to articulate a defensible principle, are two. One concern is
the severity of the restrictions imposed on state abortion laws.7 Why
should it be impermissible for a state to insist that an abortion, even
in the first trimester, should be performed by a gynecologist or
obstetrician if one we're available, rather than by any licensed
physician? Why does the due process clause forbid a state from
insisting that such an abortion be performed in a hospital, at least
in the absence of evidence that the cost would result in unfair
discrimination? Granted that most abortions in the early stages of
pregnancy are relatively safe, why is it unconstitutional for a state
to want to make them as safe as practicable? Why in the third
trimester must the state allow an abortion if only the "health"
rather than the life of the mother may be imperiled? Should not the
Court, after announcing some basic principles, have allowed the
states leeway, as is normally accorded, in applying these
principles? 2 Was this not pressing social policy beyond anything
demonstrated by the social data?
My other concern relates to the boundaries of the newly created
constitutional right of personal autonomy-for it would be best to
shed the "privacy" label and recognize that that is what it is. We
now know, as we did not before the abortion cases, that a state may
not require a pregnant woman to leave work too soon or return too
late73 and that a prohibition on the sale of contraceptives, as distin-
guished from a prohibition of their use, would violate due process.,,
We have just learned that the equal protection clause requires that
any restrictions on the right to marry must be subjected to "rigorous
scrutiny,"7 the Supreme Court's euphemism for judicial invalida-
tion of such restrictions. Two lower courts have recently held that
the principle of the abortion cases invalidates regulations and legis-
lation outlawing the use of laetrile.5 The Supreme Court of New
71. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-66 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 193-200
(1973).
72. Indeed, this is a field where much could have been learned in the "laboratories" of
the states rather than through a uniform national solution mandated by the Court. See New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
73. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
74. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
75. Zablocki v. Redhail, 98 S. Ct. 673, 679 (1978).
76. Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D. Okla. 1977); California v.
Privitera, 74 Cal. App. 3d 936, 141 Cal. Rptr. 764 (Ct. App., 4th Dist. 1977).
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Jersey has recently decided that the right to privacy also includes
the right of fornication." Statutes making homosexual conduct and
adultery crimes will surely be up for examination in the near future.
And it will not end here."8 Indeed, is there any end short of holding
that the due process clause enacted John Stuart Mill's On Liberty?79
As a citizen, I might agree that we could do without statutes such
as those just mentioned, but where do the courts get the power to
decide this?
In summary, I think that the Court's ibortion opinions should
have dealt more with the evils of today and less with history. I also
think the decisions would have been more justifiable and would
have been somewhat better accepted if they had been less severe
and less detailed."5 Finally, however unprincipled this may sound, I
would have welcomed some language indicating that the decisions
were limited to a social problem of the greatest moment and were
not to be taken as announcing a set of rights to a liberty that had
not been previously known.
However, the main lesson I wish to draw from the abortion
cases relates to procedure-the use of social data offered by appel-
lants and amici curiae for the first time in the Supreme Court itself.
In the action attacking the former New York abortion statute, over
which I presided, it was assumed from the outset that any social or
medical facts or opinions on which the parties wished to rely, unless
stipulated, should be offered in the three-judge district court and
would be subject to cross-examination"' or, where the author was not
readily available, to rebuttal. In Roe, no evidence was offered at the
hearing before the three-judge court except affidavits of two physi-
cians that legal abortions were extremely safe and illegal abortions
were exceedingly dangerous. In contrast, appellants' brief in the
Supreme Court had a supplementary appendix characterized as
being "offset reproductions of particularly relevant legal, medical
77. State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977).
78. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 64, at 654-66; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§§ 15-11, 15-14 (1978).
79. See P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 798 (1975). The refer-
ence, of course, is to Mill's statement:
The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively,
in interfering with the liberty of any of their number, is self-protection .... The
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Mill, On Liberty, in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 263 (M. Lerner ed. 1965).
80. Few will disagree with Professor Cox that "neither historian, layman, nor lawyer will
be persuaded that all the details prescribed in Roe v. Wade are part of either natural law or
the Constitution." A. Cox, supra note 56, at 114.
81. We were able to persuade the parties to do this by deposition.
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and social science publications, all of which are in the public do-
main," 2 and amici briefs favoring the appellants also contained
extensive factual statements8 of which the Court was asked to take
judicial notice. So far as I have been able to determine, the "mass
of data purporting to demonstrate that some facilities other than
hospitals are entirely adequate to perform abortions," referred to in
Doe,"4 was not before the trial court at all. The Court's conclusion
in Roe that "[m]ortality rates for women undergoing early abor-
tions, where the procedure is legal, appear to be as low as or lower
than the rates for normal childbirth" rested entirely on materials
not of record in the trial court, and that conclusion constituted the
underpinning for the holding that the asserted interest of the state
"in protecting the woman from an inherently hazardous procedure"
during the first trimester did not exist.
If an administrative agency, even in a rulemaking proceeding,
had used similar materials without having given the parties a fair
opportunity to criticize or controvert them at the hearing stage,
reversal would have come swiftly and inexorably. It will not do to
answer that the Court was merely following the illustrious example
of the "Brandeis brief." 87 The Brandeis brief was used to show that
legislation was rational since a respectable body of opinion upheld
it. It thereby supported the presumption of constitutionality. The
only factual issues concerning the materials brought before the Su-
preme Court in such a brief were whether they in fact existed, a
circumstance almost never in dispute, and how far their authors
possessed at least some competence, a fact that was rarely controv-
erted. It is altogether different when such materials are used to show
that legislation is irrational; in such a case, the materials not only
must exist but must be right." Experience has shown that eco-
nomic, social, psychological and other technical studies can be seri-
ously flawed by lack of a sufficiently large or representative sample,
by other improper methodology, by drawing conclusions outrunning
the empirical data and otherwise. I am not suggesting that the
82. See Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow of
Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. Rav. 1187, 1189-1201 (1975).
83. Id. at 1201-04.
84. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 195 (1973).
85. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149 (1973).
86. Id.
87. The name came from the innovative brief submitted by Louis D. Brandeis in Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
88. This distinction has been previously pointed out. See, e.g., Miller & Barron, supra
note 82, at 1234-35 & n.121. I would reach the same conclusion in cases where strict scrutiny
is applied. But see Goodman, supra note 45, at 282. A state's decision should not be invali-
dated simply because some experts think it is wrong.
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articles relied on by the Court in Roe were in fact wrong, although
one must wonder how well conclusions as to the safety of legal
abortions during the first trimester correlate with the holding that
the state may impose no safeguards during that period except that
the woman must secure the blessing of and have the abortion per-
formed by a licensed physician."9 The Court should set an example
of proper procedure and not follow a course which it would condemn
if pursued by any other tribunal.
I do not wish to appear too severe. The Court was working
against serious time pressures in the abortion cases. Nearly three
years had passed between the date when the Roe action was filed
and the date when it was decided after reargument. A remand for a
further hearing would have required at least another year. Mean-
while, other cases on the subject were being decided differently by
three-judge courts and state courts,"0 and many women were suffer-
ing from the delay. The ten months between argument and reargu-
ment had given the states time to answer the extra-record material
if they had wished to do so. What is disturbing is the failure of the
opinions even to advert to the procedural problem"' and to lay down
a better course to be followed in the future.
In saying that a fair opportunity must be afforded to controvert
sociological, economic, psychological or scientific material offered to
induce a court to hold a statute invalid, I do not mean that this must
be done in a full-scale, trial-type hearing. The Federal Rules of
Evidence do not restrict judicial notice of "legislative facts."9 How-
ever, as Professor Kenneth Culp Davis has written, "the simplest
common sense requires that when a judge is uncertain about needed
89. 410 U.S. at 163-65. Although the former counsel to the Mayo Clinic surely does not
regard physicians as fungible, these passages in the opinion, particularly the last, go to great
pains to leave no room for doubt that any licensed physician will do. Earlier the opinion had
recognized that the state's legitimate interest extended "to the performing physician and his
staff, to the facilities involved, to the availability of after-care, and to adequate provision for
any complication or emergency that might arise." Id. at 150. The opinion does not explain
why the state may not insist on these interests in the first trimester. I have been told by
physicians that although abortion during the early weeks of pregnancy is usually a safe and
Simple procedure, complications occasionally arise that are beyond the competence of those
without special training in gynecology or obstetrics.
90. Id. at 154-55.
91. Only the concurring opinion of the Chief Justice in Doe mentioned this. He was
"somewhat troubled that the Court has taken notice of various scientific and medical data
in reaching its conclusion" but did not "believe that the Court [had] exceeded the scope of
judicial notice accepted in other contexts." Id. at 208. I agree that the materials would have
been proper subjects of judicial notice if they had been offered at the trial level and the states
had been afforded a fair opportunity to answer. But they were not.
92. FED. R. Evm. 201(a), Notes of Advisory Committee. See also K. DAvis, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW OP THE SEVENTIES § 15.00-2 (1976).
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legislative facts, he should let the advocates know what he contem-
plates and listen to-or read-what they have to say." 3 My submis-
sion is only that if a court wishes to rely on evidence of the type
illustrated by footnote eleven of Brown and footnote forty-four of
Roe to invalidate legislation, it must give the state a fair opportun-
ity to controvert this evidence. No such opportunity is afforded
when the materials are first presented in brief to the Supreme Court
because of the time and space constraints imposed by the Court's
rules with respect to briefs and argument. If the materials are essen-
tial to support invalidation of a statute, the only alternative to a
remand or, when this would be more effective,94 a reference to a
master to hear and report, is to sustain the law without prejudice
to another attack supported by a proper factual presentation. This
would simply be saying that the particular challenger had not met
his burden of proof.95
I had intended to say something about courts deciding issues
of social policy in their review of administrative action but con-
cluded that no extensive discussion was warranted. The instances
where a court may properly substitute its judgment on social policy
for that of the agency charged with responsibility, particularly in
rulemaking, must be exceedingly rare. Unlike statutes that may
reflect the mores of the remote past which the legislature might like
to change if change were politically feasible, as has been asserted
with respect to the death penalty and abortion statutes, administra-
tive action brought to a court for immediate review reflects the
current policy determination of an agency charged with the respon-
sibility, presumably equipped with the expertise, and endowed with
the staff and the information gathering procedures not possessed by
any court. Moreover, at least in theory, the agency will alter a rule
if experience should prove it to be unwise. An agency's explicated
policy choice, if procedurally sound and within the wide discretion
permitted by its governing statute, should not be set aside as arbi-
trary or capricious simply because a court disagrees, even strongly.
The tendency of some judges in such cases "to take charge of unruly
93. K. DAVIS, supra note 92, § 15.00-3, at 364.
94. E.g., when several cases have been consolidated or when the remand would be to an
appellate court-a situation which the repeal of the three-judge court statute will make more
frequent.
95. For a discussion of a similar problem in judicial review of rulemaking, see K. DAvis,
supra note 92, § 29.01-7, and cases cited therein. For a discussion of other procedural methods
for the Supreme Court to deal with social and economic data, see Miller & Barron, supra note
82, at 1233-45. I would not favor the suggestion of the Court's appointing a panel of resident
social scientists, see id. at 1240-42, nor would I be sanguine that much could be accomplished
by attempting to "upgrade" the Supreme Court bar, id. at 1242-43.
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affairs and impose a solution that seems apt,"" because of a belief
that they have been miraculously endowed with an omniscience
denied those having direct responsibility, is to be greatly deplored.
What may sometimes be useful in a doubtful case is for a court to
require an agency to monitor its experience.
A final subject deserving mention is the elaborate affirmative
decree. The prototype was the desegregation decree directed by
Brown II," at first in the South, later in the North. Some of the ire
attracted by such decrees is due to the inherent ambiguities in the
Supreme Court's initial decisions previously noted, which time has
done little to resolve"-ambiguities that give opponents of almost
any form of decree a solid basis for complaint. But, apart from this,
the decrees have taken the courts into the lives of millions of peo-
ple-people who have done no wrong and have no voice in shaping
the decree-in a way not paralleled by anything that had gone be-
fore.99 The problems encountered in the framing of school desegrega-
tion decrees will be repeated as the courts move into the area of
integrated housing.'" They have already surfaced in the drafting of
decrees to remedy conditions in state mental hospitals s1 and pris-
ons.' Apart from the difficulty in framing such decrees, the risk of
confrontation between a court, generally a federal court, and a fin-
ancially hard-pressed city or state is fearsome, although perhaps
inescapable.
0 3
The beginning of wisdom in performing this difficult task is for
a court to recognize that its decree will "have all the qualities of
social legislation"s'-0 -legislation which, to be sure, is confined by
the basic decision of liability but as to which a wide range of possi-
96. A. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 105.
97. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
98. See Goodman, supra note 45; A. Cox, supra note 56, at 78.
99. See A. Cox, supra note 56, at 87.
100. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
101. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), discussed in A. Cox, supra
note 56, at 96-98. A companion case, Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
dealt similarly with a state institution for the mentally retarded. Both decisions were af-
firmed, as somewhat modified, in Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (Wisdom,
J.).
102. For an example of the complex remedial problems that can arise in the prison
context, see Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y.), supplemented, 377 F. Supp.
995 (S.D.N.Y.), affirmed in part, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974), on remand, 389 F. Supp. 964
(S.D.N.Y.), amended, 396 F. Supp. 1195 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 527 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1975),
motion to modify denied, 432 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See also Wolfish v. Levi, Nos.
77-2035, 77-2135 (2d Cir. Jan. 24, 1978).
103. See Friendly, The Federal Courts, in AMERICAN LAw: THE THIRD CENTURY 197, 204-
06 (B. Schwartz ed. 1976).
104. A. Cox, supra note 56, at 87.
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bilities remains open. Having thus perceived its role, a court should
follow models developed by other subordinate legislators. An invalu-
able tool is the notice and comment procedure provided for rule-
making in the Administrative Procedure Act.' °5 Notice and oppor-
tunity for comment should go well beyond the parties; it should
include all who may be affected directly or indirectly by the pro-
posed rulemaking. Indeed, the views of the parties, often being the
most extreme, may be the least useful. The judge should be free to
call for advice from persons who will not be affected at all; experi-
ence in other states or cities is likely to be more helpful than the
programs of hired experts.' 6 Meetings with committees may be
more fruitful than formal hearings; a table and a pot of coffee are
more likely to produce agreement than a witness stand and a typed
transcript. Once the judge has formulated his ideas, he should get
independent advice as to whether they will work as intended.' 7 He
should be certain to include in his decree provisions for continuous
monitoring by a master or a magistrate.0 Other devices have been
discussed by Professor Abram Chayes.' °0 Perhaps most important,
a judge confronted with such a task must insist that he be given
adequate time, both in the sense that he must not permit himself
to be rushed and in the sense that he must be freed to some extent
from other tasks. He should proceed with the caution appropriate
in directing action by other branches of government and eschew
undue detail; he can always order more extensive relief if this should
be needed. Finally, the framer of the decree should indulge freely
in the current fashion-prayer. If he has acted carefully and consci-
entiously, appellate judges should keep their hands off.
105. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). Professor Davis has called this "one of the greatest inventions
of modern government." DAvis, supra note 92, § 6.15, at 283 (Supp. 1970).
106. As has been written: "Unfortunately in many of these areas of social policy there is
no clear knowledge of what the root of the problem is, though an expert can always be found
who will oblige a judge with an appropriate program." Glazer, Towards An Imperial
Judiciary?, 41 PuB. INTEREST 104, 118 (1975).
107. The judge might read with profit Horwitz's discussion, supra note 6, at ch. 4, of
Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968);
269 F. Supp. 401 (1967), aff'd sub noma. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
further relief ordered, 320 F. Supp. 409 (D.D.C. 1970); 320 F. Supp. 720 (D.D.C. 1970); 327
F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971).
Particularly enlightening is the discussion of how the District of Columbia school board
complied with the direction to equalize per pupil teacher expenditures by moving special-
subject teachers from the west-of-the.park to the east-of-the-park schools rather than by
reallocating some of the higher cost and supposedly better teachers from the west-of-the-park
schools as the judge had anticipated.
108. Such a provision might have brought many of the defects in the Hobson decrees,
supra note 106, to light at a much earlier date.
109. Chayes, supra note 9, at 1296-1302. See generally Note, Implementation Problems
in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 HARv. L. Rxv. 428 (1977).
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It is hoped that this tour d'horizon, truncated as it has had to
be, will impart some validity to the propositions I announced so
categorically at the outset. There is no need to panic because courts
are now deciding questions of social policy; they have been doing
this throughout the history of the common law. What gives concern
is that courts are increasingly deciding such questions not just by
overruling their own decisions or filling interstices, but differently
from the way in which the questions had been decided by other
branches of government having a greater claim to legitimacy. There
must be a very strong affirmative showing of social policy before a
court is justified in reading such policy into the broad words of the
Constitution so as to invalidate legislative action. The Brown case
has instructed us as to the inadvisability of placing such a decision
on debatable grounds of social policy when traditional methods of
constitutional interpretation are readily at hand. The abortion
cases teach other lessons. A constitutional decision derived from the
Justices' notions of good social policy will fare badly, not only with
the professors but with the public, unless the public policy consider-
ations are clearly stated and the decision embodied in some rational
statement of principle. The decision should be confined to the limits
truly supported by the policy. When a court relies on social science
data as a basis for decision, it must employ fair procedures in using
facts outside the record. It should exhibit a healthy skepticism to-
wards the views of experts who claim ability to achieve a quick cure
for ancient ills. Once liability has been determined and the court
must frame an elaborate decree, it should realize that it is engaging
in rulemaking and should operate as other rulemakers do and then
keep close watch over what is going on.
This is a modest and debatable contribution to the large subject
set for discussion. Full rights of reconsideration are reserved.
[Vol. 33:21
